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We propose and demonstrate a scheme to realize a high-efficiency truly quantum random number
generator (RNG) at room temperature (RT). Using an effective extractor with simple time bin
encoding method, the avalanche pulses of avalanche photodiode (APD) are converted into high-
quality random numbers (RNs) that are robust to slow varying noise such as fluctuations of pulse
intensity and temperature. A light source is compatible but not necessary in this scheme. Therefor
the robustness of the system is effective enhanced. The random bits generation rate of this proof-
of-principle system is 0.69 Mbps with double APDs and 0.34 Mbps with single APD. The results
indicate that a high-speed RNG chip based on the scheme is potentially available with an integrable
APD array.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
Random numbers are important in many fields of sci-
entific research and real-life applications, such as funda-
mental physical research, computer science and the lot-
tery industry. Although pseudo RNs can be generated by
computer software and hardware with very high speed,
high quality truly random number generators (TRNGs)
must be adopted in some important applications. For
example, TRNGs play important roles in information se-
curity, in which quantum cryptography is an emerging
technology with potential applications to the next gener-
ation information security infrastructure.
The unpredictability of a physical procedure is the re-
source for generating truly RNs, and two steps are typ-
ically necessary to generate RNs with these procedures.
First, signals related to a random physical procedure
must be effectively generated and gathered. There have
been many TRNGs based on physics, for example, cir-
cuit noise [1–4] and radioactive decay [5]. In all available
elements, quantum mechanics is good for generating a
nondeterministic signal. Some RNGs are designed with a
quantum procedure in nature, such as wave function col-
lapse of single photon due to measurement [6–10], entan-
gled state measurement [11], effects of vacuum fluctua-
tion [12, 13] and quantum phase fluctuation [14]. In many
of these schemes, an almost single photon light source is
necessary for generating quantum signals [7, 9, 10, 15]. A
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quantum random number generator (QRNG), in which
the light source is not necessary but compatible may have
advantages in integration and usage.
The second step of a physical RNG is to implement
an effective encoding method to transform these physical
signals into RNs. The efficiency of encoding methods is
a key limitation for the generation rate of RNGs. As de-
vices and environments may vary in real time, postpro-
cessing will be necessary to generate high-quality RNs.
Even commercial products, like IdQuantique Quantis
random number generator, for which Photons - light par-
ticles - are sent one by one onto a semi-transparent mirror
and detected, cannot avoid postprocessing. Algorithms
applied to raw RNs may reduce the efficiency of the final
RNs and increase the complexity and cost of the sys-
tem. Thus, the kernel of a TRNG is an effective, encod-
ing method that is immune to slowly varying noise in-
terference and is no need for complex postprocessing to
remove bias. What should be noted here is the bound-
ary between encoding methods and postprocessing algo-
rithms. Although the boundary is not clearly defined,
we adopt the principle that postprocessing algorithms
take a large amount of resources [16]. Many QRNGs can
generate high-quality RNs by utilizing simple encoding
methods, but efficiency is a dominant limitation for most
ones [10, 15, 17], for example, the efficiency in reference
[10] is 40%. Some other one achieved very high rates by
encoding the amplitude of the probe current of the de-
tector into multi-bit RNs [18]. However, the amplitude
of the probe current is sensitive to devices and environ-
ments, so stable devices with high resolution are required
when implementing these RNGs, which indicates higher
cost and greater complexity.
2Bias-free physical processes are perfect for RNG so
that the encoding method will be mostly simple and
will use minimal resources. However, processes used in
RNG are always biased, so that the encoding method
plays a key role in the RNG to obtain high-quality RNs.
John von Neumann first proposed an unbiased encod-
ing method for biased Bernoulli trials [19]. It has been
used in QRNG [17]. However, the efficiency limitation
of the von Neumann method is 0.25. The method was
subsequently developed in order to obtain a higher effi-
ciency [20–22], among which Elias produced a very high
efficiency for infinite situations [20]. Ren et al. pro-
posed another encoding method based on the precise dis-
crimination of photon numbers of two consecutive pulses
[10].This scheme needs high precision devices to discrimi-
nate photon numbers, and the efficiency limitation of the
method is 0.5.
In this study, we propose a TRNG scheme based on
the discrimination avalanche pulses of APD. These pulses
can be generated by the dark current of APD or incident
photons, so that a light source is compatible but not nec-
essary in the scheme. A robust encoding method for bi-
ased Bernoulli trials with higher efficiency than previous
works is proposed. Furthermore, we test the system with
multi-APDs, the experiment results indicate the feasi-
bility of implementation of high-quality, robust QRNG
chips using an integrated APD array.
II. RNG SCHEME
According to the quantum theory of lasers, the photon
statistics of a laser pulse operating above threshold fol-
lows the Poisson distribution [23], which can be preserved
after drastic attenuation. The Poisson distribution is
Pλ(n) =
λn
n!
e−λ, (1)
where λ is the mean photon number of a laser pulse and
Pλ(n) is the probability that the pulse contains n pho-
tons. Thus, the coherent state produces an unpredictable
photon number for every detection, and this quantum
property can be used to implement QRNG.
If the detection efficiency of the APD is not taken into
account, the probability of an avalanche pulse caused by
a laser pulse produces a photon number n > 0 in the
pulse, which can be described as
∑
n>0
Pλ(n) = 1− Pλ(n = 0) = 1− e
−λ. (2)
The avalanche pulses of an APD can be generated by
dark currents. Because of thermal fluctuation, electrons
of the APD may transit from the top of the valence band
to the conduction band. Electrons in the conduction
band are sped up by the high reverse-bias electric field
and lead to avalanche pulses. Because the thermal fluctu-
ation at RT is much smaller than the energy gap between
the valence band and the conduction band, the transiting
probability is very small. We use the tight-binding ap-
proximation here. Thus, the transiting events of different
atoms are independent identically distributed (IID), and
the statistics of total events follow the Bernoulli distri-
bution
P (n1 = k) =
(
N1
k
)
pk1 (1− p1)
N1−k (3)
where n1 is the total electron number transiting to the
conduction band during a certain priod τ,N1 is the total
electron number at the top of valence band, p1 is the
transiting probability of a single electron, and P (n1 =
k) is the transiting probability of k electrons. As p1 is
much smaller than 1 and N1 is large in the material, the
transiting process follows the Poisson limit theorem
lim
N1→∞,p1→0
(
N1
k
)
pk1(1− p1)
N1−k =
λk1
k!
e−λ1 = Pλ1(k),
(4)
where λ1 is the mean electron number transiting to the
conduction band during τ . Thus, the electrons’ transit-
ing process follows the Poisson distribution, and so does
the dark count. The dark count is then as usable as
a laser pulse. Dark counts of APD were first used by
Tawfeeq to propose a RNG scheme [24]. The scheme was
easier and provided a new idea regarding RNG based on
APD. However, that scheme did not show an effective en-
coding method and could not generate RNs. And RNG
with high randomness based on dark counts of APD has
not been implemented before.
Because the sum of Poisson-distributed random vari-
ables follows the Poisson distribution, the sum probabil-
ity of an avalanche during τ ′ follows
p = Pλ′ (n > 0) = 1− e
−λ′ , (5)
where τ
′
is the detection window, λ
′
= η(λ + λ1) , and
η is the detection efficiency of APD. Clearly, the prob-
ability of no avalanche pulse is q = 1 − p = e−λ
′
. The
detection process is then a Bernoulli trial. A simple and
robust encoding method for biased Bernoulli trials is then
proposed here. It is an extension of the von Neumann
method but with much higher efficiency. The encoding
method is constructed as follows.
We consider the physical system of an avalanche photo-
diode (APD) working on the Geiger mode. We treat a de-
tection window of APD as a time bin and sequence these
time bins with time. According to the discussion above,
avalanches caused by laser and thermal fluctuation in dif-
ferent time bins are IID if experimental parameters are
constant, namely, p = p0. In fact, experimental param-
eters are hardly constant. We claim that our encoding
method constructed here also applies to the condition
that experimental parameters vary slowly so that the en-
coding method is effective and robust. We mark a ”1” in
a time bin if an avalanche happens in the corresponding
detection window; otherwise we mark a ”0” in it. Con-
sidering N time bins happened successively as a time-bin
3block. There are totally
(
N
k
)
possible combinations when
k ”1” are marked in the block if we do not get additional
information about the block, namely, the uncertainty of
these N time bins are
(
N
k
)
. These equiprobable
(
N
k
)
pos-
sible combinations are then encoded into uniform RNs
from 0 to
(
N
k
)
− 1. The encoding processes are one-to-
one mapping and the mapping function is
f(k1, k2, · · · , kk) =
k∑
j=1
(
N − kj
k − j + 1
)
, (6)
where, kj means that the j-th ”1” happened in the kj-th
time bin.
Then, we go to the interpretation of the mapping func-
tion. As discussed, if we only know that there are k ”1”
in the time-bin block, the uncertainty is
(
N
k
)
. If we get
the temporal information in the time bin suquence of the
first ”1”, namely, k1 is known, the uncertainty reduces to(
N−k1
k−1
)
, in other words, the information content we get
is
(
N
k
)
−
(
N−k1
k−1
)
. As similar, when k2 is also known, the
information content we get increases by
(
N−k1
k−1
)
−
(
N−k2
k−2
)
.
The uncertainty will reduce further if k3, k4, · · · are also
known. In the extreme case, if k1, k2, · · · , kk are all know,
the uncertainty remaining becomes zero, and we get all
information content about these
(
N
k
)
combinations. We
sum all information content got with k1 to kk and the
summation is the RN we want. The mapping func-
tion is f(k1, k2, · · · , kk) =
∑k
j=1
(
N−kj+1
k−j+1
)
−
(
N−kj
k−j
)
=∑k
j=1
(
N−kj
k−j+1
)
, where we have used the combination for-
mula
(
N+1
k+1
)
=
(
N
k+1
)
+
(
N
k
)
. It is evident that
(
N−kj
k−j+1
)
is monotonic with kj . Thus, the mapping function is
monotonic. The maximum possible number got from
mapping function is f(k1 = 1, k2 = 2, · · · , kk = k) =∑k
j=1
(
N−j
k−j+1
)
=
(
N
k
)
− 1. And the minimum possible
number is f(k1 = N − k + 1, k2 = N − k + 2, · · · , kk =
N) =
∑k
j=1
(
N−(N−k+j)
k−j+1
)
= 0. Thus, the encoding pro-
cess is one-to-one mapping and the RN is in
(
N
k
)
repre-
sentation.
Taking into account the wide applications of binary
RNs, the
(
N
k
)
-ary encoding method can go further and
be modified by the binary method proposed by Elias [20].
The method expands
(
N
k
)
into subblocks as follows:
(
N
k
)
= αm2
m + αm−12
m−1 + · · ·+ α02
0. (7)
So that αm, αm−1, · · · , α0 are binary expansion coeffi-
cients of integer
(
N
k
)
, where αm = 1, αi = 0 or 1
for 0 ≤ i < m. The subblock related to the α0
term should be abandoned, as it contains either one
or no member and could not be encoded into RNs.
Suppose the non-zero binary expansion coefficients are
αm, αi1 , αi2 , · · · , αil . If f(k1, k2, · · · , kk) < 2
m, convert
f(k1, k2, · · · , kk) into a m-bit binary number directly. If
2m +
∑r
s=1 2
is ≤ f(k1, k2, · · · , kk) < 2
m +
∑r+1
s=1 2
is ,
then convert f ′(k1, k2, · · · , kk) = f(k1, k2, · · · , kk) −
FIG. 1: (Color online) The schematic graph of encoding pro-
cess in time sequence, where N = 4. For the first N Time bins
(detection windows), k = 1,
(
N
k
)
= 4 = 22, f(k1, k2, · · · , kk) <
22 always holds and f(k1, k2, · · · , kk) = 3 converts into a
2-bit number ”10” directly. For the second N Time bins,
k = 2,
(
N
k
)
= 6 = 22 + 21,22 < f(k1, k2, · · · , kk) = 5 <
22+21, f ′(k1, k2, · · · , kk) = 5−2
2 = 1, thus, f ′(k1, k2, · · · , kk)
converts into a 1-bit number ”1” directly.
(2m +
∑r
s=1 2
is) into a ir+1-bit number directly (the
schematic graph of encoding process is shown in Figure
1). f(k1, k2, · · · , kk) is abandoned if ir+1 = 0.
The encoding method constructed requires p to be con-
stant among these N time bins (detection windows) of
the same block. But the p values in different blocks are
not necessarily identical, so that the method is robust
to environment noise. As detection interval of APD can
be as less as ∼ ns, it is only ∼ µs when N ∼ 100. It
is reasonable to consider that parameters, depending on
environments, which are slowly varying, are invariable in
such a short time. These parameters can be laser in-
tensity, temperature, etc. In additional, the raw RNs
generated remain uniform even the slowly varying inter-
ferences are periodic (see Section III and Section IV).
Thus, the encoding method is effective, efficiency and ro-
bust in practice.
The encoding method is effective for any k 6= 0, N .
Taking into account all possible value of k, the average
encoding efficiency per time bin before binary expansion
is
H(N, p) = −
1
N
N−1∑
k=1
(
N
k
)
pk(1− p)N−k(log2
1(
N
k
) ). (8)
A higher H(N, p) indicates a higher efficiency. For any
integer N ≥ 2, the optimal p for the average encoding
efficiency H(N, p) is 12 , and H(N, p) → S(p) as N → ∞
(see Figure 2), where S(p) is the Shannon entropy of
a single Bernoulli trial. In addition, H(N, 12 ) increases
with N and converges to 1 (the projection in circular
blue curve of Figure 2). For instance, H(5, 12 ) = 0.5604,
while H(10, 12 ) = 0.7294, the efficiency is much higher
than previous ones based on single photon discrimination
[10, 15, 17]. The theorems are proven in the Appendix.
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FIG. 2: (Color online) The average encoding efficiency per
time bin increases with N . H(N, p) (the 3-Dimensional blue
curve) converges to S(p) (the dotted red curve) with infinite
N . The projection on the left side are the efficiencies of Nk-
ary (the circular blue curve) and binary (the triangular pink
curve) encoding methods for different N when p = 1
2
. The
projection shows that the encoding efficiency will converge to
1 with infinite N when p = 1
2
. The corresponding efficiency
after the binary expansion is lower (N > 2) but will converge
to the Nk-ary one at large N .
The more subblocks
(
N
k
)
divides into, the fewer pos-
sible combinations and thus the less uncertainty of the
subblock there will be. In addition, the uncertainties
among different subblocks (blocks) are not utilized in
both encoding methods above. Thus, more subblocks
indicate more uncertainty among subblocks and hence
less extracted entropy and encoding efficiency, as the to-
tal entropy is conserved. The output sequences in binary
representation are therefore obtained at the cost of en-
tropy or efficiency, and the efficiency becomes
Hb(N, p) =
1
N
N−1∑
k=1
pk(1− p)N−k(αmk2
mkm
+ αm−1k2
m−1k(m− 1)
+ · · ·+ α0k2
0k · 0),
(9)
where the subscript k means there are k ”1” in the block.
The efficiency after expansion is shown in Figure 2 (the
projection in triangular pink curve). Moreover, more
blocks mean more resources to be required.
Afterpulsing effect will lead to bias of IID events above.
Its influence on QRNG will be discussed in Section IV. It
should be note that a similar spatial encoding method
has been proposed for a different physical system by
Marangon et.al.[25].
III. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
Three scenarios were designed in order to evaluate
the feasibility and the robustness of this scheme. (a)
Avalanche singles from a single APD was acquired and
data were encoded according to the method of Section II
FIG. 3: (Color online) Schematic setup of the experi-
ment. LD: Laser diode; IM: optical intensity modulator; BS:
beam splitter; Att: electronically variable optical attenua-
tors (EVOA); OF: optical fiber; APD: avalanche photodiode;
TDC: time-to-digital converter; PC: personal computer
in order to verify if the method can generate high-quality
raw RNs. A laser diode (LD) was added in this setup as
an optional light source to increase the RN generation
rate. By modulating the power of LD, we simulated an
additional noise and the variation of the avalanche effi-
ciency, so that the robustness of scheme was evaluated.
(b) We added an additional APD to the system of setup
(a). Two APDs were grouped, and the avalanche pulses
were gathered and processed parallelly to generate RNs.
This setup was to evaluate the possibility to increase the
RN generation rate with APD arrays while keeping the
high-quality feature of RNs. (c) In order to demonstrate
the scheme can work properly without light source, the
LD of setup (b) was removed and the avalanche pulsed
were generated only by dark counts of APDs.
The system diagram is shown in Figure 3. A pulse LD
with the wavelength of 1550 nm was used as an optional
light source and was trigged by 1 MHz electronic pulses.
An intensity modulator (IM) following the LD was used
to modulate the power of light pulses from LD. The out-
put light pulses from IM were divided into two parts by
a beam splitter (BS) and were attenuated to the single
photon level by two electronically variable optical atten-
uators (EVOA). Then light pulses of different paths were
coupled to two APDs (PGA-300, Princeton Lightwave),
individually. The APDs worked in Geiger mode. The
trigger frequency was 1 MHz and the gate width was 2.5
ns.
APDs used to detect single photons are commonly
cooled from -30 ◦C to -50 ◦C in order to reduce the dark
count rate, such as in quantum key distribution appli-
cations. In our experiments, dark count of APDs can
be used as a resource to generate RNs as well as exter-
nal photons. Thus, the cooling processes for APDs are
not necessary, which makes the system more practical
and less expensive. The APDs in our experiments were
worked at RT (approximately 23 ◦C).
The avalanche pulses of the two APDs were discrimi-
nated and amplified, then were sent into a time-to-digital
converter (Agilent U1051A Acqiris TC890) to be pro-
cessed. The TDC has one input channel of start signal
and 6 input channels of stop signals, and can convert the
time intervals between the stop and start signals into 32-
5bit numbers. The discrimination results from TDC were
sequentially numbered with the time bin of 1 µs, and
consequently encoded into RNs according to the method
of Section II in real time. As a proof-of-principle ex-
periment, the encoding process was executed every four
successive detection windows. All trigger signals in the
system were synchronized by a home-made circuit and
the delay among them could be adjusted in the step of
10 ps, respectively.
The system could be divided into three parts, as shown
in Figure 3. In Scenario (a), Part 2 was removed, thus
single APD was used to generate RNs consequently. In
Scenario (c), Part 1 was removed, and the RNs were ex-
clusively generated by dark counts of APDs. We added
a sinusoidal driving signal to the IM in Scenario (a) and
Scenario (b) with frequency of 0.05 Hz and amplitude of
3 V in order to simulate an external noise. The average
counting probabilities of the two APDs were initialized
to 0.5 by adjusting the EVOAs ahead of them individu-
ally. According to the sinusoidal modulation of IM, the
probabilities of the APDs varied from 0.3 to 0.7, which
could be regarded as an external noise to APDs.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In our experiments, we set N as 4 as discussed. The
total 16 types of detection results were classified as 5
subsets according to the k value. Two of these six-
teen types of detection results, subsets with k = 0
and k = 4, were abandoned, while the other fourteen
were set to generate RNs. The generation rates of
Scenario (a) and Scenario (b) are functions of time t.
The encoding efficiency after binary expansion of Sce-
nario (a) is Hb(N, p(t)) =
1
20
∫ 20
0 Hb(N, p(t)) dt, where
p(t) = 0.5 + 0.2sin(0.1πt). Substituting N with 4, we
obtain Hb(4, p(t)) = 0.3454, and the corresponding gen-
eration rates is about 0.34 Mbps. Scenario (b) has a dou-
ble generation rate of about 0.69 Mbps. As dark count
of APDs used in Scenario (c) is relatively low, the encod-
ing efficiency per APD is Hb(4, 0.01) = 0.0197 and the
practical generation rate is about 0.04 Mbps.
With current technologies, the generation rate of
QRNG can be 100 Mbps to Gbps with the cost of utiliz-
ing stable and high resolution equipments [13, 14, 27–29].
Although the generation rate of our proof-in-principle ex-
periment is relatively much lower comparing with exist-
ing results, it can be remarkably increased with some
measures. Firstly, using the APD array with high inte-
gration density can generate random bits concurrently
with an acceptable cost growth, as has been demon-
strated in our experiment. Secondly, the higher gener-
ation rate can be acquired with higher gating frequency
of APD which can work exceed 2GHz [27, 28]. Thirdly,
benefiting from the simple encoding method of the sys-
tem, larger N can be employed to improve the encoding
efficiency while the random generation rate will not be
restricted by the processing procedure of the raw key bits.
FIG. 4: (Color online) (a) (b) Afterpulsing probability per
gate (the gate frequency is 10 MHz) at room temperature (in
red circle) and cooling temperature (in blue dot). (c) The
schematic time sequence diagram of encoding process, where
N = 4 and k = 1.
Afterpulsing is correlated to the primary avalanche
[26]. Afterpulsing effects lead to bias of RNs generated.
We compared afterpulsing probabilities of APD at cool-
ing temperature (CT, −50◦) and RT, as shown in Figure
4. The data were measured under Geiger mode with 10
MHz gating frequency. The total afterpulsing probabil-
ity at RT is 3.3%, while it is 1.8% at CT. According to
Figure 4(a) (b), afterpulsing probability at RT is much
larger for the top gates, but it decreases rapidly to zero
and becomes smaller than that at RT after the eighth
gate.
Let pa(i) be the afterpulsing probability of the i-th
gate after primary avalanche ignition. The probabilities
of original IID Bernoulli trials are not equal any more
and extracted entropy becomes less. For the case of k =
1, showing in Figure 4 (c), the probabilities of different
events become
Pk=1(1) = p(1− p− pa(1))(1− p− pa(2))(1− p− pa(3));
Pk=1(2) = (1− p)p(1− p− pa(1))(1 − p− pa(2));
Pk=1(3) = (1− p)(1− p)p(1− p− pa(1));
Pk=1(4) = (1− p)(1− p)(1 − p)p.
(10)
where Pk=1(i) represents the probability that the
avalanche happens in the i-th time bin. For experiments
here (the gating frequency is 1 MHz), pa(1) = 4.3 ×
10−4, pa(2) = pa(3) = 0, Pk=1(1) = 0.062446, Pk=1(2) =
0.062446, Pk=1(3) = 0.062446, Pk=1(4) = 0.0625, where
p = 0.5 is adopted. The extracted entropy becomes
S = −
∑
Pk=1(i) log2 Pk=1(i) = 2− 10
−7. The reduction
of extracted entropy is negligible. When gating frequency
is 10 MHz, the afterpulsing effect is more but not that
significant. The corresponding extracted entropy reduces
as less as 2.8 × 10−4 but the corresponding generation
rate will be 6.9 Mbps. For higher gating frequency and
count rate, the afterpulsing probability is not a catas-
trophic problem. 2 GHz gating frequency and count rate
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FIG. 5: (Color online) The uniformities of RNs output from
the RNG scheme. For every four detection windows, x or
y = 0 indicates that no avalanche pulse is detected, x or y ∈
[1, 4] indicates that one avalanche pulse is detected, x or y ∈
[5, 10] indicates that two avalanche pulses are detected, x or
y ∈ [11, 14] indicates that three avalanche pulses are detected
and x or y = 15 means four avalanche pulses are detected,
where x, y ∈ integer. The altitude represents the population
of detection results in which x and y happen successively.
as high as 650 Mcount/s InGaAs APDs have been real-
ized, respectively [27, 28]. The afterpulsing probabilities,
4% for reference [27] and 1.5% for reference [28], are still
within the same level. For multi-avalanche case of high
speed APD, the analysis of afterpulsing effect is much
more complex and requires further study.
We analyzed the uniformity of the RNs generated
from these experiments to test the independence of dif-
ferent detection events. Only the uniformity of detec-
tion results of Scenario (a) are demonstrated, as shown
in Figure 5, because the other two experiments contain
very similar properties. Let p(x, y) represent the pop-
ulation of elements of a 16 × 16 matrix, which indicates
that neighboring detection results x and y happen succes-
sively, and integers x, y ∈ 0, 1, 2, · · · , 15 represent the
16 possible detection results for every four consecutive
detections.
In Figure 5, different colors indicate different popu-
lation p(x, y). Clearly, the matrix is symmetric and is
partioned into subblocks. The symmetric matrix shows
that p(x, y) = p(y, x) for any x, y. It means that there is
no time correlation between successive x and y. p(x, y)
of different elements in the same subblock are identical.
It means the population is uniform in subblocks. Thus
p(x, y) = p(y, x) = p(x)p(y). This represents that each
detection event is independent, and the imperfections of
the beam splitter and detection efficiencies make no dif-
ference to the uniformity of the randomness extraction
system. The experimental results are consistent with the
theory we proposed in Section II.
Min-entropy evaluation was employed for all these
experiments.Min-entropy, defined as
H∞ = −log2{max p(xi)}, (11)
is the evaluation of the worst situation, where p(xi) is
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FIG. 6: (Color online) (a) (b) (c) Min-entropy of samples
(data point) output from scenarios (a), (b) and (c), respec-
tively. The linear fitting function (fitting line) is shown. (d)
The relative deviations between min-entropy and Shannon
entropy of uniform distribution of all three scenarios.
the probability of possible output xi, and max p(xi)
is the maximal value of all p(xi). It is a strong way
to measure the information content, while Shannon en-
tropy is a weighted average evaluation. Both min-entropy
and Shannon entropy are special cases of Re´nyi entropy
[30, 31]. Shannon entropy is the upper bound of min-
entropy, and they coincide if and only if the distribution
of the variable is uniform [32, 33]. Min-entropy evalua-
tion is therefore a good way to evaluate the quality of
randomness of RNs.
The min-entropy of raw data from all scenar-
ios were evaluated, where i = 0, 1, · · · , d − 1 and
p(x0), p(x1), · · · , p(xd − 1) represent the probabilities of
”0”, ”1”,· · · , ”d-1” in binary representation respectively.
As shown in Figure 6, the results show that deviations
between min-entropy and Shannon entropy of uniform
distribution are all of the order of 0.001. This is within
the statistical error (∼ 3.2×10−3, the red dot line in Fig-
ure 6(d)), as the statistical amount is 105 · 2d bits, which
indicates a good quality of randomness of the RNs.
The raw binary RN samples output by using the binary
encoding method were tested using NIST statistical
test suit [34]. The standard statistical test suite, con-
taining 15 subtests, calls for a 1-Gbit sample. The stan-
dard statistical test outputs two values, the p-value and
the pass proportion, for each item. The sample passes
the standard statistical test if and only if the p values
and proportions of all items are larger than 0.0001 and
0.9805608, respectively. 20 samples for both Scenario
(a) and Scenario (b) and 7 samples for Scenario (c) were
tested by the standard statistical test. The testing results
are shown in Table I. 2 samples of Scenario (a), 4 sam-
ples of Scenario (b) and 1 sample of Scenario (c) failed
the statistical test. All failed samples only failed the
NonOverlappingTemplate test. The focus of NonOver-
lappingTemplate test is the number of occurrences of
7pre-specified target strings. The purpose of this test is to
detect generators that produce too many occurrences of a
given non-periodic (aperiodic) pattern. The test outputs
148 group of p-values and pass proportions with differ-
ent pre-specified 9-bit target strings. The sequence has
irregular occurrences of the possible template patterns
and fails the test if the p-value is smaller than the pre-
set value. Only one of the 148 groups failed the preset
value of pass proportion, 0.980, for every failed sample.
The minimum value of pass proportions is 0.975, which
is very close to 0.980. We cannot find out the reason of
failures and suspect that afterpulsing effect is a potential
candidate.
It is worth noting that samples to be tested were ex-
tracted continuously by days. Thus, interferences that
may affect the experiments were more complex. In all
scenarios, no special measures were adopted to reduce
the interference of background light noise and tempera-
ture fluctuation. Despite a few failed tests, the results of
the tests and analysis above indicate good quality of ran-
domness of raw data from all of these three scenarios and
postprocessing is not necessary. The results of Scenario
(a) were consistent with the theory analysis and show
the robust of our RNG from slowly varying interferences.
Scenario (b) and Scenario (c), with double APD, sug-
gest an APD array scheme, which is promising to break
through the generation rate limitation. Scenario (c) also
gave a relatively strict proof that dark count of APD is
usable for RNG. The light source for this scheme, to be
or not to be, is not a question any more.
It should be mentioned that although the RNG can
generate high quality raw random bits, additional post-
processing methods [35] still can be used to further im-
prove the quality of the final output. The generic frame-
work of randomness evaluating method and postprocess-
ing algorithms proposed by reference [35] provides an in-
structive guideline for design of the random signal ex-
tractors to achieve a tradeoff between the quality of ran-
domness and the cost.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have proposed and realized a robust
and high-efficiency TRNG scheme. Dark counts of APD
can be used as a resource in this scheme, so that a deep
cooling process is not necessary and the system can work
at RT. The fluctuation of pulse intensity arriving at the
APD and slowly varying interferences affect only the ef-
ficiency of the RNG rather than the randomness of the
RN series, so the scheme is compatible with light source
and background photons. The experimental results also
indicate the feasibility of integrating an APD array into a
RNG chip, which can effectively increase the generation
rate of RNs even uo to Gbps and make the scheme have
more practical value.
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Appendix
Lemma 1. Define a function f with expression below
f(N, k, p) = pk(1− p)N−k + pN−k(1− p)k
9Then, if N ≥ 2 and p ∈ (0, 12 )∪(
1
2 , 1), the equation about
k
f(N, k, p) = f(N, k,
1
2
) (12)
has two and only two roots in [0, N ].
Proof. First, we simplify equation (12) below
(1− p)N (
p
1− p
)k + pN (
1− p
p
)k = 2 · (
1
2
)N . (13)
The left of equation is symmetric about p = 12 , so we only
need to consider the case p ∈ (12 , 1), and then
p
1−p > 1.
Let a = (p/(1 − p))k. Then for any k ∈ [0, N ], we have
a ∈ [1, ( p1−p )
N ]. As k and a are one to one, we simplify
equation (13) and obtain
(1− p)N a+ pN
1
a
= 2 ·
1
2
.
Define the function
ϕ(a) = (1 − p)N a+ pN
1
a
− 2 ·
1
2
.
as p ∈ (12 , 1), we have
ϕ(1) = ϕ[(
p
1− p
)N )] = (1 − p)N + pN − 2 ·
1
2
> 0.
Next,the derivative of ϕ is
ϕ′(a) = (1 − p)N )− pN
1
a2
.
Let ϕ′(a0) = 0, a0 ∈ (1, (
p
1−p )
N ) we obtain a0 =√
( p1−p )
N . Furthermore, if a ∈ [1,
√
( p1−p )
N ), then
ϕ′(a) < 0;if a ∈ (
√
( p1−p )
N , ( p1−p )
N ], then ϕ′(a) > 0.
In addition, ϕ[( p1−p )
N )] = 2
√
pN (1− p)N ) − 2 · 12 < 0,
so the equation ϕ(a) = 0 has two roots in (1, p1−p
N ).
As k and a are one to one, it is easy to prove that equa-
tion (12) has two and only two roots in (0,N), which we
denote as x1 and x2, x1 < x2, then if k ∈ [0, x1)∪(x2, N ],
f(N, k, p) > f(N, k, 12 ); if k ∈ (x1, x2), f(N, k, p) <
f(N, k, 12 ). In addition, as f(N, k, p) = f(N,N − k, p),
we have x1 + x2 = N .
This completes the proof of Lemma.
Theorem 1. For any integer N ≥ 2, the optimal
p for normalized extracted entropy H(N, p) is 12 , and
H(N, p) → S(p) as N → ∞, where S(p) is the Shan-
non entropy of a single Bernoulli trial, and H(N, p) is
defined as
H(N, p) = −
1
N
N−1∑
k=1
Nk p
k (1− p)N−k (log2
1
Nk
),
and Nk =
(
N
k
)
is the binomial coefficient.
Proof. Let
f(N, k, p) = pk(1− p)N−k + pN−k(1− p)k,
then
H(N, p) = −
1
N
N−1∑
k=1
Nk p
k (1− p)N−k (log2
1
Nk
)
=
1
N
N∑
k=0
Nk p
k (1 − p)N−k (log2Nk)
=
1
2N
N∑
k=0
[pk (1− p)N−k
+ pN−k (1− p)k]Nk(log2Nk)
=
1
2N
N∑
k=0
f(N, k, p) Nk(log2Nk)
(14)
It is clear that when p ∈ (0, 12 ) ∪ (
1
2 , 1),
N∑
k=0
f(N, k, p) Nk =
N∑
k=0
f(N, k,
1
2
) Nk = 2,
and f(N, 0, p) = (1− p)N + pN > 2 · (12 )
N = f(N, 0, 12 ),
Thus, there exists an integer k0 ∈ (0, N) such that
f(N, k0, p) < f(N, k0,
1
2 ). Additionally, from the proof
of Lemma 1 we know there exist x1, x2 ∈ (0, N),
x1 < x2 and x1 + x2 = N such that f(N, x1, p) −
f(N, x1,
1
2 ) = f(N, x2, p) − f(N, x2,
1
2 ) = 0, and if and
only if k ∈ (x1, x2), f(N, k, p) < f(N, k,
1
2 ); thus, we have
k0 ∈ (x1, x2). In addition, if x1, x2 are integers, we have
k0 ∈ [x1+1, x2−1]; otherwise k0 ∈ [⌊x1⌋+1, ⌊x2⌋], where
⌊x1⌋ represents the largest integer that is not larger than
x1.
With the conclusion above, we will show when N ≥ 2
and p ∈ (0, 12 ) ∪ (
1
2 , 1), we have H(N, p) < H(N, 1/2).
There are two cases.
Case 1: x1, x2 are not integers, then
2
⌊x1⌋∑
k=0
[f(N, k, p)− f(N, k,
1
2
)]Nk
= (
⌊x1⌋∑
k=0
+
N∑
k=⌊x2⌋+1
)[f(N, k, p)− f(N, k,
1
2
)]Nk
= [2−
⌊x2⌋∑
k=⌊x1⌋+1
f(N, k, p) Nk]
− [2−
⌊x2⌋∑
k=⌊x1⌋+1
f(N, k, p) Nk]
=
⌊x2⌋∑
k=⌊x1⌋+1
[f(N, k,
1
2
)− f(N, k, p)]Nk.
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and
H(N, p)−H(N,
1
2
)
=
N∑
k=0
[f(N,K,P )− f(N, k,
1
2
)]
Nk
2N
log2Nk
= (
⌊x1⌋∑
k=0
+
N∑
k=⌊x2⌋+1
)[f(N, k, p)− f(N, k,
1
2
)]
Nk
2N
log2Nk
+
⌊x2⌋∑
k=⌊x1⌋+1
[f(N, k, p)− f(N, k,
1
2
)]
Nk
2N
log2Nk
= 2
⌊x1⌋∑
k=0
[f(N, k, p)− f(N, k,
1
2
)]
Nk
2N
log2Nk
+
⌊x2⌋∑
k=⌊x1⌋+1
[f(N, k, p)− f(N, k,
1
2
)]
Nk
2N
log2Nk
≤ 2
⌊x1⌋∑
k=0
[f(N, k, p)− f(N, k,
1
2
)]
Nk
2N
log2N⌊x1⌋
+
⌊x2⌋∑
k=⌊x1⌋+1
[f(N, k, p)− f(N, k,
1
2
)]
Nk
2N
log2N⌊x1⌋+1
=
⌊x2⌋∑
k=⌊x1⌋+1
[f(N, k, p)− f(N, k,
1
2
)] ·
Nk
2N
· [log2N⌊x1⌋+1 − log2N⌊x1⌋]
< 0.
The last inequality holds, because there exists integer
k0 ∈ [⌊x1⌋+1, ⌊x2⌋], and ⌊x1⌋+1 ≤ ⌊x2⌋ = N−1−⌊x1⌋,
thus, ⌊x1⌋+ 1 ≤
N
2 , so N⌊x1⌋+1 ≥ N⌊x1⌋.
Case 2: x1,x2 are integers, then analogously,
H(N, p)−H(N,
1
2
)
= 2
x1∑
k=0
[f(N, k, p)− f(N, k,
1
2
)]
Nk
2N
log2Nk
+
x2−1∑
k=x1+1
[f(N, k, p)− f(N, k,
1
2
)]
Nk
2N
log2Nk
≤ 2
x1∑
k=0
[f(N, k, p)− f(N, k,
1
2
)]
Nk
2N
log2Nx1
+
x2∑
k=x1+1
[f(N, k, p)− f(N, k,
1
2
)]
Nk
2N
log2Nx1+1
=
x2∑
k=x1+1
[f(N, k, p)− f(N, k,
1
2
)] ·
Nk
2N
· [log2Nx1+1 − log2Nx1]
< 0.
The last inequality holds, because there exists integer
k0 ∈ [x1 + 1, x2 − 1], and x1 + 1 ≤ x2 − 1 = N − x1 − 1,
thus x1 + 1 ≤
N
2 , so Nx1+1 > Nx1 . We have therefore
proved that the optimal p for normalized extracted en-
tropy H(N, p) is 12 , and we will next show the remaining
part.
First, as
2N =
N∑
k=0
(
N
k
)
=
N∑
k=0
Nk.
we have log2Nk
N
< 1 for 0 ≤ k ≤ N . Assuming that
0 < p < 12 , the cases that
1
2 < p < 1 and p =
1
2 are
similar, so there exists δ > 0 sufficiently small such that
p+ δ < 12 , by the weak law for a binomial distribution,
lim
N→∞
∑
p−δ< k
N
<p+δ
Nk p
k (1 − p)N−k = 1.
Thus, given any ǫ > 0, there is an N′ such that for N >
N′, ∑
| k
N
−p|≥δ
Nk p
k (1− p)N−k < ǫ . (15)
Thus, together with log2Nk
N
< 1, we have
∑
| k
N
−p|<δ
Nk p
k (1− p)N−k
log2Nk
N
< H(N, p)
<
∑
| k
N
−p|<δ
Nk p
k (1 − p)N−k
log2Nk
N
+ ǫ .
Because p + δ < 12 , when |
k
N
− p |< δ, we have
log2N⌊N(p−δ)⌋−1 ≤ log2Nk ≤ log2N⌊N(p+δ)⌋+1, so
∑
| k
N
−p|<δ
Nk p
k (1 − p)N−k
log2N⌊N(p−δ)⌋−1
N
< H(N, p)
<
∑
| k
N
−p|<δ
Nk p
k (1− p)N−k
log2N⌊N(p+δ)⌋+1
N
+ ǫ .
Together with equation (15), we get
(1− ǫ)
log2N⌊N(p−δ)⌋−1
N
< H(N, p)
<
log2N⌊N(p+δ)⌋+1
N
+ ǫ .
Using Stirling’s formula on both side
(1− ǫ)S(p− δ) ≤ lim
N→∞
H(N, p) ≤ S(p+ δ) + ǫ .
As ǫ and δ are arbitrary, with the continuity of S(p), we
obtain limN→∞H(N, p) = S(p).
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
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Theorem 2. H(N, 12 ) increases to 1 as N approaches
infinity.
Proof. With the conclusion of Theorem 1, we have
H(N, 12 ) converging to 1 as N approaches infinity. It
therefore remains to be proven that H(N, 12 ) is an in-
creasing function.
First, we have
H(N,
1
2
) =
1
(N + 1) · 2N+1
N∑
k=1
(N + 1)k log2(N + 1)k
=
1
(N + 1) · 2N+1
[
N∑
k=1
Nk log2(Nk
N + 1
N + 1− k
)
+
N∑
k=1
Nk−1 log2(Nk−1
N + 1
k
)]
=
1
(N + 1) · 2N+1
[
N∑
k=0
Nk log2(Nk
N + 1
N + 1− k
)
+
N∑
k=0
Nk log2(Nk
N + 1
k + 1
)]
=
N
N + 1
H(N,
1
2
) +
1
(N + 1)2N+1
· [
N∑
k=0
Nk log2
(N + 1)2
(N + 1− k)(k + 1)
] .
Thus, H(N + 1, 12 ) ≥ H(N,
1
2 ) is equivalent to
1
2N+1
[
N∑
k=0
Nk log2
(N + 1)2
(N + 1− k)(k + 1)
]
≥ H(N,
1
2
) =
1
N · 2N
N∑
k=0
Nk log2Nk
⇐⇒ N [
N∑
k=0
Nk log2
(N + 1)2
(N + 1− k)(k + 1)
]
≥ 2
N∑
k=0
Nk log2Nk
⇐⇒
N∑
k=0
Nk log2
(N + 1)2N
[(N + 1− k)(k + 1)]N (Nk)2
≥ 0 .
As (N + 1− k)(k + 1) ≤ (N2 + 1)
2 and Nk ≤ N⌊N
2
⌋, it is
sufficient to prove
(
2N + 2
N + 2
)N ≥ N⌊N
2
⌋ . (16)
Next, we prove inequality (16) by induction. When
N = 1, (2N+2
N+2 )
N = 43 ≥ 1 = N⌊N2 ⌋; When N = 2,
(2N+2
N+2 )
N = 94 ≥ 2 = N⌊N2 ⌋. Assuming that when N =
k− 1, k ≥ 2, we have ( 2k
k+1 )
(k− 1) ≥ (k− 1)⌊ k−1
2
⌋. Then,
whenN = k+1, we have (k+1)⌊ k+1
2
⌋ =
k(k+1)
⌊ k+1
2
⌋(k+1−⌊ k+1
2
⌋)
·
(k− 1)⌊ k−1
2
⌋. By the induction hypothesis,(k+1)⌊ k+1
2
⌋ ≤
k(k+1)
⌊ k+1
2
⌋(k+1−⌊ k+1
2
⌋)
( 2k
k+1 )
(k − 1), it remains to show
k(k + 1)
⌊k+12 ⌋(k + 1− ⌊
k+1
2 ⌋)
(
2k
k + 1
)(k − 1) ≤ (
2k + 4
k + 3
)k+1.
(17)
We prove the inequality (17) by two cases.
Case 1: k is even, then ⌊k+12 ⌋ =
k
2 , and inequality (17)
is equivalent to
k(k + 1)
k
2 (k + 1−
k
2 )
(
2k
k + 1
)k−1 ≤ (
2k + 4
k + 3
)k+1
⇐⇒
k + 1
k + 2
(
k
k + 1
)k−1 ≤ (
k + 2
k + 3
)k+1
⇐⇒ (
k(k + 3)
(k + 1)(k + 2)
)k−1 ≤
(k + 2)3
(k + 1)(k + 3)2
⇐⇒ (
k2 + k3
k2 + 3k + 2
)k−1 ≤
(k + 2)3
(k + 1)(k + 3)2
.
(18)
Since
(
k2 + k3
k2 + 3k + 2
)k−1
≤
k2 + 3k
k2 + 3k + 2
·
k2 + 3k + 1
k2 + 3k + 3
· · ·
k2 + 4k − 2
k2 + 4k
=
(k2 + 3k)(k+3k + 1)
(k2 + 4k − 1)(k2 + 4k)
=
(k + 3)(k+3k + 1)
(k + 4)(k2 + 4k − 1)
,
it remains to show
(k + 3)(k+3k + 1)
(k + 4)(k2 + 4k − 1)
≤
(k + 2)3
(k + 1)(k + 3)2
⇐⇒ (k + 3)3(k + 1)(k2 + 3k + 1)
≤ (k + 2)3(k + 4)(k2 + 4k − 1)
⇐⇒ (k4 + 10k3 + 36k2 + 54k + 27)(k2 + 3k + 1)
≤ (k4 + 10k3 + 36k2 + 56k + 32)(k2 + 4k − 1).
Since k ≥ 2, we have k2 + 3k + 1 ≤ k2 + 4k − 1, so the
inequality above is hold.
Case 2: k is odd, then ⌊k+12 ⌋ =
k+1
2 , and inequality (17)
is equivalent to
k(k + 1)
(k+12 )
2
(
2k
k + 1
)k−1 ≤ (
2k + 4
k + 3
)k+1
⇐⇒ (
k
k + 1
)k ≤ (
k + 2
k + 3
)k+1.
Since k
k+1 ≤
k+1
k+2 , it is sufficient to prove
k+1
k+2 (
k
k+1 )
k−1 ≤
(k+2
k+3 )
k+1. Notice that the inequality above is the same
as inequality (18), so the next proof is the same in Case
1.
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
